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Suboptimal behavior is a serious social and economic issue. A large number of economic studies have investigated this area, 
offering evidence and theories on its mechanism (e.g., Ainslie, 1992; Laibson, 1997; Loewnstein and Prelec, 1992; O’Donoghue 
and Rabin, 1999). Based on the development of research in suboptimal behavior, the present study aims to describe consumer 
dynamics under changing tastes due to self-control problems. This work will pay particular attention to the two types of 
self-control problem under changing tastes. The first relates to the implication of present-biased time preferences for consumer 
dynamics, in which a self-control problem arises out of time-inconsistent preferences, with taste change occurring in the form of 
preference reversal. The second is on consumers’ self-control or restraint as regards the consumption of tempting goods, in which 
case preferences change owing to willpower depletion. 
Using an overlapping generations model, Chapter 1 describes the interactions between naive and sophisticated hyperbolic 
discounters in general equilibrium. In this work, consumers are categorized under two types: Sophisticates, who incorporate their 
time-inconsistency into their consumption/saving choice; and naïfs, who do not. Naïfs overestimate their future propensity to 
save, thereby overforecasting future equilibrium asset prices, whereas sophisticates correctly forecast future asset prices by 
incorporating the naïfs’ misforecasts. Consequently, naïfs are exploited through capital transactions by sophisticates. Capital 
losses play a part in naïfs’ fall into bankruptcy, which may occur when they are highly present-biased, highly patient, and small in 
proportion. This chapter shows that under permissive conditions, the equilibrium is globally stable and Pareto inefficient in the 
ex-post sense. 
Chapter 2 discusses an overlapping generations economy inhabited by two types of present-biased consumers: sophisticates 
and naïfs, who may not be hyperbolic consumers. Under sufficient conditions, demonstrated using myopic separability, a type of 
equilibrium may exist in which naïfs, because of their misforecasts, are exploited by sophisticates through Dutch Book 
transactions. The sufficient conditions are as follows: (i) the sophisticates’ population is sufficiently small; (ii) savings for all 
consumers do not decrease when a current interest rate increases; (iii) the savings ratio for middle-aged consumers is sufficiently 
small in steady-state equilibrium; (iv) and short-selling is prohibited. 
In Chapter 3, by incorporating the dynamic interaction between depletable willpower and self-control (or restraint in the 
face of tempting consumption), the study re-examines consumption/saving choices in the presence of tempting and non-tempting 
goods. Willpower functions as a substitute for wealth in that willpower depletion or restoration occurs in parallel with wealth 
accumulation or decumulation. Willpower is a source of patience for curbing tempting good consumption. As such, a 
good-specific time preference depends on how tempting a good is and how much willpower a consumer has. Empirical findings 
in existing literature indicate that an increase in external self-control tasks raises time preference with respect to the tempting 
good and then shifts consumption from the non-tempting good to the tempting one. In the long run, tempting goods are Giffen 
goods. Naive consumers, who are incognizant of the presence of the dynamic willpower constraint, consume more tempting 
goods and have more willpower depleted in the long run compared with sophisticates, who are aware of the willpower constraint. 
In the case of naïfs, whether impatience is increasing or decreasing with respect to their wealth depends on whether a domain 
good is tempting or non-tempting. When self-control has a strong willpower-bolstering effect, willpower can relate positively to 
tempting good consumption, its time preference, and wealth holding. 
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